Suppose determinism is true and we are like characters in a play in that there is only one possible plot. Does this diminish us as moral beings? Certainly we can still make moral judgments about the decisions people make in the same way we can morally judge characters in a play. But can we make the deeper kind of judgments that we routinely reserve for actual people who make actual choices? (We’ll call these “deep moral judgments”).
On a physicalist view of the world, human behavior and consciousness is the result solely of chemical and electrical processes in the brain. So a physicalist who makes a moral judgment about someone is at bottom making a judgment about the way that person’s brain functions on a physical level. If a physicalist thought Hitler was evil, it would really amount to a belief that the chemical and electrical functioning of Hitler’s brain was evil. That makes Hitler sound more like a natural disaster than evil.
The dualist doesn’t have this problem. The soul rather than the brain is really in charge, and there’s no problem with saying Hitler’s evil soul should be damned to hell. But then you have to posit the existence of souls.
Physicalists are often determinists, but the difficulty of making deep moral judgments from a physicalist position doesn’t turn on weirdness introduced by determinism. They are distinct positions. Consider the opposite pairings.
Dualist/determinist. Even if Hitler’s soul was “fated” to do what it did and couldn’t have done it differently, it is still the case he (or his soul) did these awful things with relish and that in itself is sufficient to make a deep moral judgment against him (and earn him a well-deserved place in hell). So determinism doesn't present a problem for morally judging hitler.
Physicalist/nondeterminist. Even if Hitler’s brain really wasn’t locked into its processes by determinism, his actions were still the result of brain processes. To be sure, these are to be regretted as a natural disaster is regretted. But it loses traction when we try to make it into a deep moral judgment. So absense of determinism doesn't make the physicalist's moral judgment less clinical.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
determinism and free will
There is the objection that determinism means that people don’t actually choose what they do, and hence one can’t make deep moral judgments about them or oneself. It’s as if someone took my arm and hit you with it. It’s not my doing, so I don’t deserve the blame (or praise). In a deterministic universe, the subject is almost a passive observer.
One response is that moral judgments aren’t just about actions, they are about character, motives, and good will. If one has a good heart, one deserves praise even if one was born with it or developed it through experience in a determined universe.
Second, I think it is enough when making a deep moral judgment that one could say that another person would have been less good or less bad. True, the act itself had to happen given all that came before, but that is because the actor is the kind of person the actor is. If Jane “must” do good works instead of sit around and drink beer, that says something morally praiseworthy about the kind person Jane is.
Third, I don’t think there’s the tension between free will and determinism as is sometimes made out by advocates of free will. Whether one is in a determined universe or a non-determined universe, one’s will is going to depend on the kind of person one is and the circumstances one is in. Only schizophrenics have real choices in such matters.
Fourth, absence of free will usually means that someone else's will is substituted for our own. In a religious context, it would be God (though he famously declined). But in a determined universe, no one else is in charge of us. We are who we are, and make the decisions we do, because of genetics, environment, experience, etc. That is, exactly the same as in the kind of universe we think we live in.
One response is that moral judgments aren’t just about actions, they are about character, motives, and good will. If one has a good heart, one deserves praise even if one was born with it or developed it through experience in a determined universe.
Second, I think it is enough when making a deep moral judgment that one could say that another person would have been less good or less bad. True, the act itself had to happen given all that came before, but that is because the actor is the kind of person the actor is. If Jane “must” do good works instead of sit around and drink beer, that says something morally praiseworthy about the kind person Jane is.
Third, I don’t think there’s the tension between free will and determinism as is sometimes made out by advocates of free will. Whether one is in a determined universe or a non-determined universe, one’s will is going to depend on the kind of person one is and the circumstances one is in. Only schizophrenics have real choices in such matters.
Fourth, absence of free will usually means that someone else's will is substituted for our own. In a religious context, it would be God (though he famously declined). But in a determined universe, no one else is in charge of us. We are who we are, and make the decisions we do, because of genetics, environment, experience, etc. That is, exactly the same as in the kind of universe we think we live in.
Multiple “nows”
Suppose determinism is false, perhaps because there is room for chance in the physical world (at least at the sub-atomic level as according to quantum theory), or because spirits that operate outside the physical world can affect it. If so, the “now” has two functions. First, it is the subjective sense of current experience each of us has. Second, it is the point in time at which a multitude of logically possible events with varying degrees of probability are turned into a single set of actual events. For example, if “now” is occurring prior to your roll of a dice, there are six possible outcomes, but if “now” is occurring when or after the dice comes to rest there is one actual outcome.
On this view, “now” plays a crucial roll in converting multiple possibilities to a singular actuality. It is where things happen and the story is cemented in place. It is where other possibilities disappear. Multiple “nows” would be problematic since it would require the events between nows to be both cemented in place and wide-open with possibilities. If events are cemented for later nows, then the view from earlier nows that possibilities are wide open (or even a bit open) is merely an illusion. So if determinism is false, there must be a single universal now.
Suppose instead determinism is true. The “now” still has its subjective function for each of us, but it no longer has the function of turning multiple possibilities into a single actuality. The future has only one set of logically possible events.
On this view, the prospect of multiple “nows” isn’t so problematic because “now” is only tied to subjective experience and doesn’t play the larger roll of cementing multiple possibilities into singular actualities. They are all cemented that way, from the time of the big bang to the end of the universe. “Now” simply becomes one of many possible points in the universe, sort of like a scene we are watching in a long play – it’s where we are experiencing the play, but none of the content of the play hinges on the fact that we are at this scene instead of another scene.
On this view, “now” plays a crucial roll in converting multiple possibilities to a singular actuality. It is where things happen and the story is cemented in place. It is where other possibilities disappear. Multiple “nows” would be problematic since it would require the events between nows to be both cemented in place and wide-open with possibilities. If events are cemented for later nows, then the view from earlier nows that possibilities are wide open (or even a bit open) is merely an illusion. So if determinism is false, there must be a single universal now.
Suppose instead determinism is true. The “now” still has its subjective function for each of us, but it no longer has the function of turning multiple possibilities into a single actuality. The future has only one set of logically possible events.
On this view, the prospect of multiple “nows” isn’t so problematic because “now” is only tied to subjective experience and doesn’t play the larger roll of cementing multiple possibilities into singular actualities. They are all cemented that way, from the time of the big bang to the end of the universe. “Now” simply becomes one of many possible points in the universe, sort of like a scene we are watching in a long play – it’s where we are experiencing the play, but none of the content of the play hinges on the fact that we are at this scene instead of another scene.
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